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Abstract Using long-term anthropological observa-
tions at the Center for Biological and Environmental
Nanotechnology in Houston, Texas, the article
demonstrates in detail the creation of new objects,
new venues and new modes of veridiction which
have reoriented the disciplines of materials chemistry
and nanotoxicology. Beginning with the confusion
surrounding the meaning of ‘implications’ and
‘applications’ the article explores the creation of
new venues (CBEN and its offshoot the International
Council on Nanotechnology); it then demonstrates
how the demands for a responsible, safe or ethical
science were translated into new research and
experiment in and through these venues. Finally it
shows how ‘safety by design’ emerged as a way to
go beyond implications and applications, even as it
introduced a whole new array of controversies





‘Beyond Good and Evil.—At least this does not mean
beyond good and bad.’
1
There is evidence that ‘buckyballs’ are toxic to
humans and the environment. And this might be a
good thing. Before we might even object to such a
claim, controversies emerge. What is a buckyball?
What kinds of buckyballs, synthesized how, in what
kind of solution? Pure or ‘functionalized’ (having
molecular groups attached to the shell)? In aggre-
gates or alone? Moving through an environment or
body, or collecting there? Toxic to what? To cells,
organs, animals, environments? Causing what kind
of damage?
Between 2004 and 2007, the National Science
Foundation Center for Biological and Environmental
Nanotechnology (CBEN) at Rice University in
Houston, Texas and an outgrowth of CBEN called
the International Council on Nanotechnology
(ICON) created new venues for defining what
buckyballs (buckminsterfullerenes) are and what
counts as toxicity. In the process developed new
‘modes of veridiction’ through which truth claims
about safety and toxicity could be reconfigured as
truth claims about the very nature of matter. As such,
‘toxicity’ was transformed from something that was
the concern of those ‘downstream’ from chemistry or
engineering into an engineerable property of new
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CBEN was originally funded (2001) to research the
‘applications’ of nanotechnology to environmental and
biological issues, but quickly became embroiled in
controversies around safety, risk, and concern for the
responsible development of nanotechnology. Vicki
Colvin, Mark Wiesner, Kristen Kulinowski, Kevin
Ausman,JenniferWest,RickSmalleyandseveralothers
were closely involved in the creation of this new center
and the definition of its research mission. From the
beginning, Colvin and Wiesner argued at length (with
each other and in public) over the definition of what the
Center’s core mission would be; later, with the help of
Kulinowski (who was both executive director of CBEN
and director of ICON), Colvin broadly communicated
CBEN’s mission, first under the label of ‘Wow to
Yuck?’ and later under the label of ‘Safety by Design’
([23]; cf. [35]). Because of the intense scrutiny that
CBEN experienced based on its controversial research
mission, members devoted more and more resources to
the attempt to understand the ‘implications’ of
nanotechnology. ICON, for example, was an outgrowth
of CBEN (funded primarily by corporations and a
supplementary NSF grant) intended to bring multiple
stakeholders (government, corporate, academic, and
civil society) together.
2 Its purpose was to explore the
possibilities for pursuing responsible nanotechnology
and communicating the risks and implications clearly.
3
Together these two new venues initiated research into
the toxicity of buckyballs, transformed the meaning
of the ‘fundamental’ properties of buckyballs and
raised the question of who has the right and obligation
to study them.
Scientists inside and outside of CBEN, especially
nanotechnologistsandmaterialschemists,hadextremely
hostile reactions to CBEN and its proposal to study risks
to human health and the environment. They often
claimed instead that the very research they proposed to
do was a major risk to the health (i.e. funding and
public acceptance) of nanotechnology as a viable
discipline and research area. In response, CBEN and
ICON argued that not conducting research on the
health and environmental risks was what created the
risk of public backlash, and which would be an even
greater threat to nanotechnology research.
It was these two competing definitions of ‘implica-
tions’ that were eventually figured out by members of
CBEN and ICON: risks to human and environmental
health on the one hand, and risks to nanotechnology
itself on the other.
4 This double meaning of ‘implica-
tions’ created confusion, but it was a kind of productive
misunderstanding by which different problems and
researchquestionscouldbedistinguished.Thelanguage
of ‘implications’ often inscribes a familiar distinction
between a pure domain of nanotechnological investiga-
tion and an affected society in which there are
unpredictable biological, environmental and social
reactions to putatively basic research. But given the
dual meaning of the term in this context, both the
definition of what counted as pure science and what
counted as the social, or non-scientific domain being
affected, were undecided. Scientists and engineers from
different backgrounds came to the project with different
understandings. Materials chemists and those most
earnestly calling themselves nanotechnologists defined
CBEN’s research in terms of applications designed to
solve biological or environmental problems. Environ-
mental engineers, toxicologists and some bioengineers,
on the other hand, sought to put the study of
implicationsonparwiththatofapplications—toexplore
not only the fundamental control of matter, but
fundamental concern about matter and its effects as
well.
5
In the midst of this controversy CBEN began to
experiment with different approaches to the problem:
the development of ICON and the idea of ‘safety by
2 The story of the founding and transformation of CBEN and
ICON is told in more detail in a related publication: [28].
3 Initially, CBEN’s budget included modest funding for social
science (including for the research in this paper). As ICON and
CBEN continued to call for more funding in this area, they
became responsible for some of the momentum that led to the
funding of the NSF Centers for Nanotechnology and Society in
2005.
4 On the anthropological elaboration of ‘figuring out’ amongst
actors in contemporary society, see [12].
5 Aword on the distinction between mode of concern and mode
of control. The distinction has a fractal character, just as the
distinction between basic science and implications does,
depending on who is exercising the concern or the control.
Kearnes [20] maps some of the ways that the language of
‘control of matter’ used in nanotechnology is always already a
concern for particular values. In the story of safety by design,
at issue is which kind of concerns, exactly, will be synthesized
into a mode of control of matter: concerns over safety and risk,
or concerns for energy efficiency, cost or profitability.
80 Nanoethics (2009) 3:79–96design’ described in this article. When ICON was first
created it seemed to be a way to channel the social
issues—the issues of public perception and the threat
to nanotechnology—away from and outside of the
scientific core of CBEN. But what it achieved even
more effectively was the channeling of questions about
responsibility, implications, impact and society directly
into the heart of scientific work funded by CBEN. The
outcomeofthisarrangementisthestorywe tellhere,the
attempt to make ‘safety’ a fundamental property of new
nanomaterials: ‘safety by design.’
This article relies on anthropological methods and
data to clearly demonstrate how this transformation
came about—how the values being debated around
‘implications’ worked themselves into the very warp
and weft of scientific and engineering activities and
perhaps even into matter itself.
6 The demand in
contemporary nanotechnology for an ethical approach,
or even more generally for ‘responsible science’ [28]
was in this case worked over through an array of
techniques, governance structures, new venues and
new metrics into something scientifically precise—a
mode of veridiction. It became something that scientists
and engineers could argue about (and vigorously) in a
rarified and increasingly standardized language that
maintains the quality of being value-neutral even as it
expresses deeply held concern about consequences that
a r ei m p o s s i b l et of o r e s e e .
The reason for the anthropological approach
employed here is to unfold the process whereby these
answers were reached, and the ramifications they
have for the near future—and not only to report
answers as they stand now. It has repeatedly been
shown in the literature in history, philosophy and
social study of science how ‘science made’ displaces
‘science in the making.’
7 The work of stabilizing facts
about the world is both experimental and rhetorical.
In the case we offer here, we argue that it is all the
more important to track and reveal this process of
stabilization, not only in order to re-affirm the
epistemological claims, but to demonstrate how, and
which, values have now become embedded in the
domain of nanotechnology.
This particular story of scientists at CBEN is far
from generally true of nanotechnology—few other
major centers of nanotechnology research have shown
the kind of concern and creative re-evaluation of safety
that CBEN has, and it remains a model to be emulated.
However, the process described here, whereby value
(in this case ‘safety’)i sd i r e c t l ye m b e d d e di nt h e
experimental and theoretical work of science, is a more
general process. We describe this process, following
work by Rabinow and Bennett [34] on synthetic
biology, as the creation of new venues within which
shifting ‘modes of veridiction’ can come about and be
tested, with ramifications for the very definition of new
scientific objects (like buckyballs and their safety).
Whether or not ‘safety by design’ will become a
standard or an expectation in nanotechnology remains
to be seen—but the possibility itself had to be
painstakingly invented.
Can safety be a property of materials on par with
other ‘fundamental’ properties like thermal conduc-
tivity, light absorption or stress/strain ratios? Based on
this research, it is clear that what will count as
fundamental is related to the definition of what counts
as implications and what as basic science. In the case
of nanotechnology, therefore, it is directly related to
the fact that different scientific traditions, disciplines
and communities are brought into contact.
8 In the story
told here, the field of materials chemistry has been
brought into direct connection with the environmental
and biological sciences at the most basic level—akin to
the role physics has historically played (and continues
6 Anthropological research in this context includes long-term
participant-observation amongst researchers in the centers and
labs described here; telephone and in person interviews both
formal (semi-structured and open ended) and informal (in the
hallway or in offices); scrutiny of published and unpublished
documents (research reports, grant proposals, documents used
to coordinate and organize center research; and email corre-
spondence) including reading and discussion of this paper and
others at various stages. See [21] for a more extensive
discussion of this method in nanotechnology.
7 Latour [26] is the locus classicus for the claims about ‘science
in the making.’ Cf. Melinda Fagan’s recent work reconstructing
the social context of stem cell research in order to demonstrate
the alternate epistemological claims that can be made when one
goes beyond simply the publications or textual claims [9, 10].
8 Conventional terms in science studies that might describe
‘safety by design’ include boundary object’ [40], boundary
organization [16]o r‘trading zone’ [13, 14]—spaces within
which intellectual differences, practical incompatibilities or
linguistic translations are worked out. However, these concepts
might not capture the specific re-working of values at stake in a
case like the one presented here because they tend to emphasize
the liminal space within which translations happens, and not the
wholesale construction of new ways of distinguishing true and
false within a discipline. A recent issue of Perspectives of
Science reports on a related research into the origin and
configuration of research in science. See [19, 29, 30]
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resource.Butthis‘bringingintoconnection’alsohasthe
power to remake some basic claims about matter. For
instance, in classical chemistry, a new material like the
buckminsterfullerene (C60) is generally characterized
with respect to properties measured and theorized in
the idioms of physics: stress and strain, thermal and
electrical conductivity, or molecular characteristics like
solubility in water or strength of hydrogen bonds. Such
are the established fundamental properties which nano-
technologists exploit in different ways in order to craft
newmaterialswithparticularcharacteristicsandimplied
uses (and on which successful nanotechnologists make
their careers).
Defining ‘safety’ in similarly fundamental terms,
however, requires bringing in concepts from biology
and environmental science, such as oxidative stress,
the response of cell membranes and their receptors,
complexregulatorypathways,transportanddegradation
in marine and other ecologies and so on. These
properties can also be exploited to craft new materials
with implied uses. Hence the claim that buckyballs are
toxic, but thatthis might bea goodthing;given the right
tools and experimental designs, toxicity can be tuned
and controlled just as optical properties can be. Such a
practice generates a new mode of veridiction in which
claims about the safety of materials can be deemed true
or false in new ways.
In the past, pioneers in nanotechnology have made
their careers not primarily on the synthesis or
discovery of materials but on the characterization of
materials with respect to function. For example, the
use of quantum dots for Light Emitting Diodes
(LEDs) is generally associated with the work of Paul
Alivasatos at UC Berkeley; similarly, the exploitation
of carbon nanotubes for energy-related uses occupied
much of Richard Smalley’s research at Rice. It is
precisely this ‘career-making’ aspect of the research
which CBEN and Vicki Colvin have sought with the
development of ‘safety by design.’ Safety becomes
something whereby scientists can make new
materials, make them safe and thereby make a career
(or at least a legitimate and recognizable contribution)
in nanotechnology.
Naturally,materialschemists’andnanotechnologists’
careers are not the only ones at stake in such a move.
Toxicologists, environmental scientists and engineers,
biologists, as well as ethicists and social scientists have
also sought to make names for themselves by studying
the properties of new nanomaterials . The last four
years have seen the emergence of both a field called
‘nanotoxicology’ ([32]; see also [25]) and one called
‘nanoethics’ [6], both arguably attempting to define
and own some version of ‘safety’ in nanotechnology.
9
For nanotoxicologists, for instance, ‘safety’ is not a
property of materials, but a spectrum of (poorly
understood) risks; environmental scientists and engi-
neers, in addition, see this spectrum of risks as more
than just a question of engineered materials, but one of
complex ecosystems and subtle differences in the
processes of manufacturing, disposing, and remediation
of man-made materials. Most disagree on whether
nanotechnology poses known or unknown risks, and
have different opinions about and definitions of
uncertainty; many would support a redefinition of their
practices in terms of uncertainty rather than risk, but
would do so in different ways [15].
At the heart of practical scientific activity there-
fore, the most detailed and novel debates about
responsibility are taking place in idioms that on the
surface seem to have little to do with those of ethics,
regulation, or justice. But nor does the transformation
of safety into a fundamental property occur simply
because of the internal dynamics of scientific curios-
ity. Rather, in practically seeking new ways to
become ‘responsible’ scientists actually create a need
for responsible science—a new need that no previous
configuration of sciences and disciplines claimed
ownership over, and which can be filled (or fought
over) as if it were the discovery of a new scientific
field. Indeed, it is perhaps the only reliable manner
through which responsibility will become practically
‘doable’—by making it into something on which
careers can be staked and towards which creativity
can be channeled. Without such novelty, safety (and
other forms of responsibility) are too easily seen as a
9 The former is rooted firmly in a long history of work on
ultrafine particles, including natural nano-scale particulate
matter and its effect especially on pulmonary activity. It does
not seek in any current form to create new materials or change
the way materials are produced except insofar as it can
demonstrate the toxicity of one kind of matter over another.
The latter actively distances itself from environmental health
and safety research as a domain that is distinct from properly
ethical concerns, or concerns which nanoethicists worry are
obscured by too heavy a focus on EHS research. This paper
might then be seen as a kind of ‘nanoethics of EHS research,’
albeit one that claims to reveal ‘ethics in the making’ in the new
venues of CBEN and ICON.
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no one, given over to consensus politics and treated
as a bureaucratic issue (an iteration of the known
with new variables) devoid of creative resolution or
exploration.
Finally, this article does not argue for or against a
particular version of safety. It should be understood
instead as a ‘characterization’ (by analogy with the
work of chemists who characterize new materials) of
new venues, modes of veridiction and objects
emerging in nanotechnology. The point of such an
activity is to make it possible to articulate the values
and the modes of argument being built into the near
future of nanotechnology, in order to reflect in a
grounded and empirically precise way, on the questions
of ethics and responsibility which actually face us in
concrete settings.
Carbon fullerenes (buckyballs), for instance, are
not yet clearly defined as objects. Despite the ease
with which scientists and science journalists refer to
them as ‘soccer-ball shaped molecules with sixty
carbon atoms’ the definition of carbon fullerenes is far
from settled—whether or not they will be defined
according to properties that include the environment
and biology is as yet undetermined. Re-defining
carbon fullerenes’ fundamental properties in terms of
safety could re-formulate everything from state
regulation of materials to corporate marketing of
them to standardization of their nomenclature. Not
doing so will have similar ramifications.
Similarly, this story also demonstrates how new
venues create a space for the incubation or filtering of
values. ICON functions, metaphorically speaking, as
a membrane to CBEN. It communicates CBEN’s
science to an unpredictable public, but it also
receives, transduces and conducts the demand for
responsibility into the cytoplasm and nucleus of
experimental scientific work.
Finally, new modes of veridiction emerge—meaning
simply that the criteria for true and valid scientific
claims is reworked in these new venues and around
these new objects. Whether buckyballs are ‘toxic’ is
not a question that can be answered without specifying
a few things about buckyballs as such. To cleave
towards a definition given only in terms of number of
atoms, strength of bonds, or shape permits no valid
statement about toxicity; cleaving towards a definition
given in terms of oxidation, free radicals, functional-
ization of the surface and mobility in different
ecosystems, by contrast, permits a new set of truth
claims to be made, challenged, defended and strength-
ened. Such claims can only be made by building new
laboratories, recruiting new configurations of graduate
students, and seeking money from unlikely places, or
channeling it in ways it was not meant to be channeled.
Object, venue and mode of veridiction therefore are
interdependent in this story, and they are animated by a
concern with making new things, making things safe,
and thereby making new careers.
Fine Lines and Ultrafine Particles
Almost immediately after being funded, the Center for
Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology
(CBEN) found itself under intense scrutiny for their
proposed research on the environmental and biological
implications of nanomaterials. Even though they had
designed the center to emphasize the ‘applications’ of
nanotechnology to biological and environmental uses
over the implications to environmental and biological
health, there were both internal and external pressures
on this configuration. Applications meant things like:
membranes created with nanotechnology to filter
polluted water (an ‘enviromental application’)o rg o l d
nanoshells used to treat cancer (a bioengineering
application). Implications was fuzzier, but tended to
mean concerns over FDA approval, environmental
impact and toxicity and exposure studies. Internal to
CBEN, there were tensions over whether implications
research was properly scientific or not; externally there
were corporations and civil society actors demanding
more focus on the risks of new nanomaterials like C60
and carbon nanotubes. In reaction to this focus on
implications, understood as risks to environment and
biology, many nanotechnologists outside of CBEN
began to focus on the risks to nanotechnology itself—
also labeled ‘implications’—that would emerge if
scientists started talking about and investigating the
former kind of risks.
10
Fellow nanotechnologists, advisors, funders, deans
and presidents, tried hard to silence two of the CBEN
principals, Vicki Colvin and Mark Wiesner; they tried
to prevent them from speaking about the need for
such research, prevent them from being invited to
10 See [28] for a detailed description of the founding of CBEN
and the role of implications.
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meetings with the administration concerning how to
reign in their promotion of such research. The anxiety
over the potential de-funding of nanotechnology due
to public backlash was fueled from many sources—
fear and lack of understanding of ‘the public’; popular
misrepresentation in the press, novels and films; and a
general consensus that one must logically develop
positive applications before testing them for negative
consequences. The double meaning of implications
severely confused the debate: implications sometimes
meant risks to human health and environment, and
sometimes meant risks to nanotechnology of a public
backlash and subsequent de-funding. Many human
and social scientists also accepted this blurred
meaning of implications, and have missed the
opportunity, as Ebbesen [8] points out, to move
beyond the issue of public acceptance.
CBEN principals exacerbated this confusion by
giving frequent talks; Wiesner spoke often about not
repeating the failures associated with DDT, Freon and
Asbestos. Colvin and executive director Kristen
Kulinowski developed the story of a ‘Wow to Yuck?’
trajectory of nanotechnology ([23, 24]; see also the
analysis by [35]). By 2003, Colvin, Wiesner and
executive director of CBEN, Kristen Kulinowski had
given versions of their ‘wow to yuck?’ talk ‘over two
dozen times’ to public audiences. Colvin had testified
before congress in April of that year, had applied for
‘supplemental funding’ from the NSF for work on
implications, and had begun to appear regularly on
the roster of events as the keynote speaker who would
address potential impacts of nanomaterials.
In October of 2003, Vicki Colvin published a
‘perspectives’ paper in Nature Biotechnology called
‘The potential environmental impact of engineered
nanomaterials’ [4]. It was the first high-impact review
of its sort, and was based primarily on the existing
literature studying the toxicology, exposure and
transport of ultrafine particles. CBEN had begun
collecting and curating articles related to toxicological
and environmental issues around 2003 in a database
that would become the centerpiece of the work that
ICON would do in 2004–5, and was eventually
transformed into a ‘virtual journal’ highlighting
specific articles in the area. Colvin’s piece was based
on these and rehearsed some of the basic issues of
studying EHS: the need for understanding exposure as
well as toxicity (such as occupational and manufac-
turing exposure and exposure through consumer
products); the various systems for testing toxicity
(human cell cultures, mouse fibroblasts, and animal
models for pulmonary and neurological toxicology
studies); issues of water-solubility and aerosolization
and issues of free radical chemistry and anti-oxidation
functions of new nanomaterials. The paper explicitly
invokes the specter of a ‘more skeptical and demand-
ing public’ that wants not only benefits but a
commitment to ‘anticipate and characterize potential
risks’ as well. It ends with a version of what had by
then become the CBEN party line which combined the
two kinds of implications, risks to human and environ-
mental health, and risks to nanotechnology: ‘Though it
is challenging to assess the risks of engineered nano-
materials before commercial products are well defined,
proactive research is critical to ensuring a sustainable
nanotechnology industry (1169).’
Colvin’s Nature Biotechnology paper fueled the
existing fire of controversy around studying the
implications of nanotechnology. For one thing, it made
explicit the concern that no data exists—positive or
negative—and so speculating about risks was unwar-
ranted. But this was also Colvin’s central message:
without data, claims about the safety (or even the
proposed benefits) of nanomaterials are equally as
speculative, and perhaps more irresponsible. The paper
posed the question in straight-forward terms: ‘are
nanomaterials hazardous?’ Such a question was at the
heart of the controversy. Colvin’s critics argued first
that asking this question was inherently dangerous to
the funding prospects of nanotechnology because of
the unpredictability of the public and the media. More
pointedly, they argued that it was not the responsibility
of scientists in nanotechnology, but the responsibility
of regulatory agencies and corporations who should
test materials before commercializing them. At the
heart of the debate was the question of the novelty of
nanotechnology, and therefore the novelty of the risks
of nanotechnology. If nanotechnology is really new,
Colvin frequently argued, then we need really new data
about toxicity and exposure, which would require basic
science in this area. If however, existing science and
toxicology (and regulation) regarding bulk materials is
good enough, then it suggests there is nothing
genuinely new about the nanomaterials being pro-
duced. Furthermore, it raised the question of whether
new venues were needed—are existing regulatory
agencies equipped to deal with nano as if it were not
84 Nanoethics (2009) 3:79–96new, or will new regulations, even new agencies, be
necessary?
Colvin argued that not asking these questions was
as irresponsible and dangerous to humans and the
environment as asking them was to nanotechnology’s
future. Her critics consisted mainly of her colleagues
in nanotechnology, chemistry and physics, and the
leadership at NSF, including her own program
manager. Siding with her in different ways were
social scientists, civil society and environmental
groups, corporations, environmental scientists and
toxicologists.
A key reason for the intensified affect of the debate
was the absence of data to argue about. As Colvin
puts it: ‘We had no data, and we were beginning to
speculate... which makes scientists pretty angry.(Vicki
Colvin, Interview #1; hereafter VC#1).’ In the period
between 2001 and 2003, almost no research on the
toxicity or exposure of nanomaterials was funded (or
conducted) through the National Nanotechnology
Initiative (NNI). According to Dunphy-Guzman et
al. [7], the NNI spent only 0.5% of its budget between
2000 and 2004 on ‘implications of engineered
nanoparticles’—the vast majority of which went to
CBEN through the National Science Foundation.
There were related developments in research, perhaps
most specifically in the toxicology of ‘ultrafine
particles’ which were primarily incidentally (not
deliberately) produced, and frequently divided into
‘naturally occurring’ nanoparticles (e.g. produced by
forest fires or volcanos), unintentional anthropogenic
(such as diesel exhaust, metal fumes or cooking
fumes) and intentional anthropogenic (buckyballs,
nanotubes, rods and wires) [32].
The lack of data created the possibility for
speculation—both about the hazard and about the
safety of nanomaterials. With little new research
funding forthcoming, Colvin realized (in late 2003)
that she needed to change her own research to address
the problems she was discussing in public:
The other thing that happened in 2003 is that I’d
had a lot of interactions with EPA and they
issued a call. They took all of their nano money
[about $16.5 million] and they put it in
implications and we basically wrote that call. I
did. I went out, I wrote it.... All of a sudden 5
million bucks a year started to flow into the area
that wasn’t just us [CBEN] and so, somewhere
around 2004, I actually switched my research
because I realized if I’m out here talking about
it, I need to be doing it. So I started to actually
collaborate in this project more with the bio-
engineers and some of the folks over at
environmental engineering. And so 2004 and
2005 was a little bit of a sea change. We started
to get data, data that my students were engaged
in. [VC#1]
It is somewhat of an irony that Colvin, of the three
principals of CBEN, turned out to be the one who
would change her research so dramatically in the
direction of toxicology, and not the environmental
engineer Mark Wiesner (who had extensive experience
with the EPA) nor the Bio-engineer Jennifer West.
Colvin’sdesiretochangeherresearchseemedtoissuein
part from the fact that there was no data, but also in part
from her reaction to people telling her not to do such
research. Like many scientists, Colvin characterizes
herself as someone who reacts very strongly when
people tell her not to do something, or that something
cannot be done. Colvin saw this as an opportunity to
open up a new direction for research in her lab.
Wiesner, for his part, had also embarked on
toxicology research, but opted for a slower and more
deliberate entry into the field than Colvin. Wiesner
recalls:
In fact, we started work in that area around the
same time but took a very different, and much
slower approach from that of Vicki. Toxicology
is a landmine of a field and I made the decision
early on that it was not the sort of thing you learn
to do in between snacks.Sorather thantry and do
the tox work ourselves, we began collaborations
with bonafide toxicologists-initially in France
(Marseille Medical School), since I had contacts
there, and later at UCLA. Ultimately having
access to environmental toxicologists and a
medical school where we could do that kind of
work was a key factor in my decision to come to
Duke (Personal communication, 2008).
Wiesner’s characterization captures the institutional
and disciplinary locations of the different sciences. As
an environmental engineer, rather than a materials
chemist, his position vis-a-vis toxicology emphasized
differentaspects,bothintermsofitsinternalcomplexity
and in terms of what he might gain from such a
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with which she might argue with her colleagues in
nanotechnology and materials chemistry, and not to
move into the field of toxicology completely.
CBEN’sinitialorganizationprovidedlimitedfunding
fortoxicology,anddidnotrefertoitassuch.CBENwas
not organized around the existing disciplinary lines of
toxicology, eco-toxicology, or health research. Indeed,
one of the reasons that Colvin’s critics within the NSF
hadgivenfor tryingtosilence her hadbeenthattheNSF
does not fund toxicology. Toxicology, they claimed, is
more properly the province of the regulatory agencies
such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
Environmental Protection Agency(EPA), or the Nation-
al institutes of Health (NIH) and implied that it was not
basic science, and definitely not nanotechnology.
However, the meaning of ‘implications’ and the core
research science differed depending on the discipline, a
fact that became evident in the creation of CBEN. For
the environmental engineer Mark Wiesner, eco-
toxicology is basic science, whereas for bioengineer
Jennifer West, biological toxicology came further
downstream, primarily at the FDA, and after the
materials had been created. Colvin and her supporters
had begun to realize, however, that neither the FDA nor
the EPA had planned to treat nanotechnology as special
in a regulatory sense, and instead to apply the same tests
and standards it does to bulk materials.
Wiesner and West therefore represented two sides of
a line that Colvin was trying to walk: on the one hand, a
mode privileging concern with strong roots in the
environmental movement, suspicion of unregulated
production, and a way of arguing in which indication
of harm is a call to action and control; on the other
hand, a mode privileging control with strong roots in
engineering, a suspicion of government regulation, a
belief in unconstrained basic research and a way of
arguing in which indication of benefit comes before
testing and verification of safety. Colvin’s biography
places her firmly in the latter camp: a ‘born and bred’
nano person, specifically materials chemistry and
optics of materials and a student of Paul Alivasatos
with a widely cited paper and patent on Cadmium
Selenide LEDs [5]. ButwiththefoundingofCBENand
the interaction with Wiesner and other environmental
scientists, with the intense scrutiny of nanotechnology,
she has found herself in the former mode as well.
Changing her research, therefore, did not imply that she
was giving up the mode of control in favor of a mode of
concern. Instead it meant trying to find venues in which
to synthesize the two modes.
The biggest barrier to this new research direction
was that Colvin had no graduate training in biology
(much less toxicology or environmental science).
Learning the tools and techniques of biology and
environmental science posed a barrier to research,
rather than a starting point. But in classic form,
putting two of her students on projects related to
toxicology was a way to learn fast; and a way to work
on making her career as well. All of a sudden, a
whole new series of experimental tools and systems
presented themselves: cell cultures and bacteria, rats
and bass, systems biology, environmental science and
ultrafine particle toxicology.
The field of toxicology of ultrafine particles was one
ofthe first topresentitselfasalikelyvenueforthekinds
ofquestionsthatColvinsoughttoanswer.Inparticulara
family trio of researchers: Gunter, Jan and Eva
Oberdoerster. Gunter Oberdoerster was one of the
leaders in the study of mammalian toxicity of ultrafine
particles, and Colvin invited him to present his work to
CBEN, with an eye to collaborating on studying the
environmental toxicity of nanotechology. Oberdoerster
declinedandinsteadsuggestedhisdaughter,Eva,whose
work was in the area of endocrine disruptors and
environmentaltoxicology,andwhoranalabatSouthern
Methodist in Dallas. The story of Colvin’sc o l l a b o r a t i o n
with Oberdoerster, and its breakdown, reveal many
aspects of how values in science work themselves into
the heart of laboratory research. Colvin’s attempt to
synthesize the two meanings of implications ramified
into a personal story with both predictable and
unpredictable elements.
Colvin assigned her student, Christie Sayes, to the
project. She sent her to Dallas to learn from
Oberdoerster how to do toxicological studies both in
cellcultureandlargemouthbass,ofwhichOberdoerster
had a school remaining in the lab from previous EPA-
funded work. For one of the first experiments on the
large-mouth bass, Colvin provided the fullerenes from
‘the punch bowl’—fullerenes that had been made
in-house and solubilized in water at Rice. Sayes lugged
alargeamount(about5litres)ofpurefullerenesinwater
to Dallas which were added to the water in which the
fish swam. They conducted standard tests (48 and 96 h
exposures) and measured damage to the gills and brains
of the fish. They compiled the results and continued
with more studies to verify what they were finding: that
86 Nanoethics (2009) 3:79–96there was indeed some evidence of damage to the gills
and brains of the fish. But it was at this point that the
external conditions of the state of nanotechnology
research and the dual meaning of ‘implications’ began
to impinge on their laboratory research. Oberdoerster
described the first hiccough this way:
I was running out of fullerenes, so I asked Vicki
if she could send some more and she said,
‘Absolutely not. I don’t like the direction this is
going; that you are actually finding effects.’ She
said ‘Honestly I didn’t think you would find any
toxicity and I don’t want this getting out.’ And I
said oh, ok, that’s oh, I see... but’ we’ve done
this and a priori we had planned out what we
were gonna do and when we were going to
publish... (EO Interview #1, 2008, hereafter
EO#1)
Oberdoerster felt the situation was especially
unfortunate for Sayes. She was in her lab, staying
with her at her home and now caught in the middle of
what was developing into a professional dispute. Not
knowing what to do with this new information, she
awkwardly continued the research with Sayes and
went back and forth with Colvin through the winter of
2004. She argued that the data was solid, that it was
an interesting result, that they were seeing damage but
also seeing healing in the gills, and most important
that she was eager to get the result out so that others
could try to replicate it. Sensing that Vicki did not
want the paper published, for whatever reason,
Oberdoerster eventually decided to go ahead with
publishing the results.
Vicki, as she realized that this was going
forward and getting ready for publication, asked
that her name be withdrawn from it, and what
she told me was that she never expected there to
be toxicity, her whole career is based on these
particles, and they cannot be found toxic,
because then she cannot go forward with her
research. (EO #1)
Colvin also described asking for her name to be
removed,butsuggestedthatherreasoningwasdifferent.
Colvin argued that there was not enough data to be
convincing, that the study was set to be controversial,
and most importantly, that it dealt only with pure
‘underivatized’ (uncoated) buckyballs—a form that
were not generally commercially available. Taken
together these elements enhanced Colvin’s sense that
the risk to human health represented by these tentative
results was probably a good deal smaller than the risk to
nanotechnology represented by their publication.
Oberdoerster agrees that whatever the reason for
Colvin’s decision to remove her name, there was
tremendous resistance to this line of work, strong
personalities in nanotechnology and other factors
contributing to the decisions that each of them made
about the timing of submission or publication. Add to
this, there was a clear sense of the advantage in career
advancement that this kind of research represented to
both of them; whoever managed to publish first in this
new field would be the one who gained the most
attention in the media, amongst peers and hopefully
with funders.
But there are other confusing and some downright
weird aspects to this part of the story. In the winter of
2004, Colvin had already begun her own series of
studies on fullerenes and their effect on tissue culture
(work also done primarily by Christie Sayes), in the
hopes of generating further data that might either
challenge, supplement, or perhaps preempt the results
that Oberdoerster was getting. Both women started to
submit the results of this work around the same time,
in early spring of 2004 and according to Colvin,
Oberdoerster submitted to Science ‘right around the
same time we tried to submit, which was part of the
issue for one of the reviewers because he [sic] clearly
had looked at both papers (VC#2).’ In addition to
claims about the data and its reliability, concern about
the style of the research, and the possible risks to the
health of nanotechnology by the publication of such
work, issues of career advancement and gender also
began to play a role. Seen solely from the published
literature it seems that Oberdoerster published her
study in Environmental Health Perspectives in April
of 2004 [31], and Colvin published her first study
later in Nano Letters in August of 2004 [36]. Behind
the scenes—or between them—the story is weirder.
Both had submitted to Science but neither paper
was accepted. The New York Times nonetheless
tracked Oberdoerster’s experiment and publication,
and in late March (along with the appearance of her
article) ran a profile of Oberdoerster and her study.
11
For Colvin this was not simply a competitive blow
11 Barnaby Feder, ‘Health Concerns in Nanotechnology,’ New
York Times March 29th, 2004
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the New York Times), but it also revealed and
exacerbated a strange set of gender dynamics as well:
The New York Times did a huge article [with a]
picture of Eva... and Eva unfortunately kind of
looks like me and so people got me and Eva
confused. They would think I was Eva… and
this, this is weird, but if you’re a woman in
science... So there was a TV interview right after
that [NYT article] and I was very public in this
TV interview, so then the, this connection
between me and this New York Times article
became very large, even though I intentionally
did not take part in [Eva’s study], I did not quote
it, I didn’t want to have anything to do with it,
predominantly because... I was trying to walk
this very fine line. So, so I became ambivalent
myself about taking a public role because the
perceived costs, you know losing the center, for
example, as a director. (VC#2)
TheconfusionofColvinandOberdoerster,especially
by fellow scientists was problematic for more than the
obvious reasons of gender inequity and power relations.
Oberdoerster is neither a nanotechnologist nor a
chemist, but a toxicologist, and her study made a direct
leap towards the effect of buckyballs on the whole
animal(brainandgilldamageinlargemouthbass).Even
if Colvin were in principle in support of such research,
s h ed i dn o tw a n tt ob ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h i sp a r t i c u l a r
style—orhaveitconfusedwithwhatCBENwascreated
to do, which was primarily to study applications of
nano to biology and the environment. Colvin claims
she had ‘scrubbed any recognition of my name or [my
grad student’s] name from that paper, but I had to
acknowledge CBEN because we spent money on the
project.(VC#2)’
The ‘fine line ’ that Colvin was walking implied a
difference between the scientific approach to under-
standing nanomaterials as such, and the ‘downstream,’
less prestigious and ‘risky’ (to nanotechnology) toxi-
cology work. As Colvin puts it, most scientists perceive
toxicology as a simple question: ‘did the rat die?’ and
not something worthy of funding at a basic level, at a
center like CBEN: ‘there is something more
fundamental here [and] I don’tk n o wt h a tI ’ve been
able to make that case strongly with my community
[materials scientists and nanotechnologists] yet
(VC#2).’
Oberdoerster,bycontrast,sawlittletonothingnewin
‘nano’ toxicology. Given that her father had worked on
ultrafine particles since the 70s, that toxicology has a
long history of theorizing risk rigorously through
defininghazardandexposure,andthe factthatsynthetic
chemists in the pharmaceutical industry routinely asked
questions about how to measure and understand the
safety of the compounds they created, Colvin’sq u e s -
tions seemed like business as usual—or worse, as
withholding research findings. For Oberdoerster, it was
the perceived threat to a nascent nanotechnology that
overwhelmedColvin’sabilitytoreasonclearlyaboutthe
science. Oberdoerster characterizes the field as full of
‘strong personalities’ who can get things done but also
create problems and pressures that can obscure the
science. For Oberdoerster, the work was routine; novel
only on the surface because of the material and because
of the attention it garnered her by virtue of the media
hype surrounding nano.
Colvin’s own ongoing study, therefore, tried to walk
a ‘fine line’ by being both a toxicology study and an
attempt to explore ‘something more fundamental.’
Colvin’s resistance to participating in Oberdoerster’s
study was driven by an intuition that new modes of
analyzingthesematerialswerenecessary—thatitwasn’t
simply a toxicology question about a new material.
Furthermore, she knew that ‘her community’ simply
wouldn’tcareaboutthisresearchifthatwerethecase.In
other words, it had to be formulated in terms which they
could experience as within an established ‘mode of
veridiction.’
Mark Wiesner’s comment that toxicology is ‘not
the sort of thing you learn to do in between snacks’
reflects his own concern with CBEN’s (and Colvin’s)
perhaps brazen entry into this already well-established
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work that brought materials chemistry to bear on
problems for which toxicologists and environmental
scientists already possessed tools and a history created
exactly the kind of dangerous ‘interdisciplinary’
middle ground often decried as being neither one
nor the other. Wiesner’s more diplomatic approach
was focused on bringing these fields together around
existing tools and practices, rather than trying to forge
a new space entirely.
Nonetheless, it’s possible to see, even from the
published literature alone, how Colvin was attempting
to change the nature of the question confronting both
sides—to in effect invent a new mode of veridiction.
Instead of asking ‘is C60 toxic?’ as Oberdoerster had,
Colvin started to ask instead: ‘which species is most
toxic and why?’ Given Colvin’s background in
chemistry and nanotechnology, her concern about the
materials in question extended beyond the simple
definition of C60 as a soccer-ball shaped particle with
60 carbon atoms. Pure buckyballs are obviously
interesting—Smalley, Kroto and Curl received a Nobel
prize for characterizing them—but practically speaking
theyaren’tparticularlyusefuluntiltheyare‘derivatized’
or coated in order to increase their solubility, or turn
them into substrates to which we can add other
molecules for novel purposes. This means that the
identity of ‘carbon fullerenes’ actually includes a huge
family of different engineered ‘functionalizations.’ It is
this feature of the control of materials that gives
nanotechnology some of its novelty—something that
has its closest parallel in the work of synthetic chemists
in the pharmaceutical industry, where approaches such
as combinatorial chemistry can create a huge array of
variations on a single molecule. Each of these different
functionalizations might therefore have different hazard
and exposure profiles. The prospect of needing to find
funding and scientists to study each and every one
seemed both impossible to Colvin, and scientifically
inelegant. The first paper to be published from Colvin’s
new experiments, also written with Christie Sayes,
appeared in Nano Letters in August of 2004: ‘The
Differential Cytotoxicity of Water-Soluble Fullerenes,’
[36], and as the title suggests, focuses on comparing
different toxicities of water-soluble species of C60.
The 2004 Nano Letters paper is a case study in
walking ‘fine lines.’ The abstract begins by stating ‘we
show that the cytotoxicity of water-soluble fullerenes is
a sensitivefunctionofsurface derivatization’suggesting
that the question of toxicity is not a simple one, and
furthermore,a‘sensitive’onerequiringcarefulscientific
experimentandtheorization.Thearticleends,‘thiswork
demonstrates both a strategy for enhancing the toxicity
of fullerenes for certain applications such as cancer
therapeutics or bactericides, as well as a remediation
for the possible unwanted biological effects of pristine
fullerenes’ (emphasis added). Within the abstract—
arguably the most tightly and strategically written
aspect of most scientific papers—the battle lines over
this kind of research are clear: Colvin wants to
associate herself with the ability to create new
biological applications of nanomaterials, but also to
characterize their toxicity as a function of their
structure. On the one hand buckyballs are toxic, but
on the other hand this can be a good thing. On the one
hand fully derivatized buckyballs are safe (or safer),
and on the other hand ‘pristine’ buckyballs can have
‘possible unwanted biological effects.’ The article
hews to the line that what makes nanotechnology new
isthe exploitationofthepropertiesthatmaterialshaveat
the nanoscale; what makes Colvin’s contribution new is
that one of these properties is their toxicity—and no one
has yet characterized this clearly to her mind.
Compared to the Oberdoerster piece, which remains
resolutely in a mode of pure concern—concern over
spillage and dumping, accumulation and oxidative
stress oncellmembranes—theNano Letters piece uses
an idiom that mixes concern and control calculated to
navigate between the two kinds of implications: risks
to environment and biology, and risks to nanotech-
nology. It creates a new ‘mode of veridiction’—a new
set of criteria for truth claims about nanomaterials.
Rather than making claims about toxicity in a
language of hazard, exposure and risk, it makes
claims about toxicity in a language of engineering and
controlofmatter.Ratherthanrelyingondatathatwould,
in a roundabout way, provide evidence for or against
actionstaken(e.g.bygovernmentsorcorporations)with
respect toC60,C o l v i n ’s article presents data that might,
in a roundabout way, serve as the basis for engineering
materials differently. This new veridiction, however,
would only function with an attendant jurisdiction
within which it makes sense to make such claims, and
this is what Colvin’s ‘fine line’ indicates—the problem
of the legitimacy of this new approach.
The last paragraph of the article recapitulates this
fine line. On one side:‘This provides striking evidence
that water soluble functional groups on the surface of
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of pristine C60 (1886).’ Which is to say, toxicity exists,
but it is an interesting problem for materials chemists
and nanotechnologists—one related to the properties of
the material, its derivatizations, and its surface chem-
istry. On the other side, a rhetorically complex
assertion: ‘this work demonstrates that hydroxylation
of the C60 cage could be used as a remediation for the
possible unintentional biological effects of pristine
fullerenes (1886).’ Coating buckyballs remediates
possible unintentional effects of buckyballs; which is
to say, if they are coated, the possibility that pristine
buckyballs have for causing unintended biological
damage is remediated—or presumably, prevented to
begin with.
Colvin’s article does not directly contest or engage
Oberdoerster’s work, though it does cite it. Many
issues are collapsed in the appearance of these two
articles—they emerge from different trajectories,
represent different ways of making truth claims about
materials, different practical approaches to laboratory
experiment, and different concerns about the signifi-
cance of the results. The results of Colvin’s study are
viewed with skepticism, even hostility, by many
toxicologists and environmental scientists, but as
Colvin repeatedly pointed out in our interviews, prior
to this point [3] there was nothing to argue about—no
data and no results concerning new nanomaterials.
Skepticism and hostility, however uncomfortable, are
much preferred to unwarranted speculation. By 2006,
the number of papers had ballooned into a healthy
debate conducted over a startlingly large number of
journals [33].
Exit Risk, Enter ‘Safety by Design’
After these first publications in 2004, research in the
toxicity of buckyballs was underway, as were
competing definitions of what would count as valid
scientific research in this area. During this year,
Oberdoerster, together with Mark Wiesner and his
students (and with Kristen Kulinowski and Colvin’s
help) subsequently discovered that the supposedly
pure C60 that Colvin had contributed was actually not
quite pure. It formed aggregates in solution, so-called
nC60, which in itself might suggest different effects to
be tested for, but more importantly, the solubilization
process combined with the formation of clusters
meant that some of the toxic solvent (tetrahydrofuran
or THF) used to make C60 enter into solution remained
trapped inside ‘eggs’ of C60.
12 For Oberdoerster this
contamination was unfortunate, perhaps confounding
the evidence of damage in her 2004 study, but more
than that it represented an unrealistic environmental
scenario: C60 would never enter solution in lakes and
streams and sewers with the help of THF. To rectify
this irrealism, she tried adding C60 to water and simply
stirring it for days until it entered solution, which it
slowly did. When some Danish colleagues complained
that they couldn’t get the same result, she also
discovered that it the action of UV light from the
window above the stir-plate that helped the solubiliza-
tion along. Both the action of stirring (wave action)
and the presence of UV represented more realistic
proxies of an environmental exposure route for the
fullerenes.
For Oberdoerster, defining hazard and exposure,
and doing so realistically were the priorities. For
Colvin, by contrast, hazard and exposure ‘realism’
was secondary to the characterization of ‘differential
cytotoxicity’—a result that could be either good or
bad, depending on a use case, and might be a route to
‘something more fundamental.’ To say ‘bucky balls
are toxic, but this might be a good thing,’ as Colvin’s
paper had, was to emphasize a different problem
concerning nanomaterials than that highlighted by the
realism of Oberdoerster’s approach, in which the
toxicity of the substance is implicitly related to its
entry into and persistence in the environment in
particular ‘natural’ ways. At the heart of the emerging
debate, therefore, was not only a question of whether
fullerenes were toxic, but which kinds, how to study
them, and in what tradition of research—and at the
limit, a definition of what counts as natural and what
as designed.
Looking at these first publications in detail, it is
thus possible to see the battle being waged outside the
laboratory. The questions Colvin, Wiesner and
Oberdoerster were asking were not bubbling up from
laboratory exploration, but channeled into those labs
by external debates. The scientific papers could be
read on their own as mere statements of fact, as they
are rhetorically constructed to do—but when one
12 The effect of the solubilization process was studied subse-
quently by Mark Wiesner and colleagues in France, and the
results published as Brant et al. [2].
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rise to the papers it becomes easy to see the complex
political, and sometimes personal negotiation taking
place.
13 In the details of the experimental design
and the careful justification of the results, one can
chart the course between the ‘pure’ need for research
into the environmental and biological effects of
nanomaterials (a rhetorical necessity), and the intense
affect, career maneuvering, political struggle and
sometimes personal attacks on and among Colvin,
Wiesner, Oberdoerster as posing risks to the health of
nanotechnology.
The complex negotiation within the science, in the
university, and in the public grew out of the confusion
around the meaning of implications—risks to biology
and environment or risks to nanotechnology? It was
only by working through these differences that Colvin
and others could start to ask more precise questions in
the laboratory—questions different from those asked
by toxicologists on the one hand, or nanotechnolo-
gists on the other. ‘The Differential Cytotoxicity of
Water-Soluble Fullerenes’ is neither normal science
nor paradigm-shattering, but a kind of strategic
working over of the demand for responsibility, into
a form of science that is both application and
implication at once, both concern and control: it was
an attempt to define safety as a fundamental property
of materials.
For the first four years of their work in CBEN,
Colvin and executive director Kulinowski had pitched
the story of ‘Wow to Yuck?’ asking whether the initial
love-affair with the benefits of nanotechnology would
turn to a repugnance when facts about their danger to
biology and environment emerged. Such a framing
was useful because it integrated the two kinds of
implications—though not intentionally. If heard from
the perspective of nanotechnologists, the story was all
about public perception of nano and risks to its health,
if heard from perspective of toxicologists or social
movement activists, the story was about the need to
study hazards and risks of new materials. Neither
message was quite what Colvin aimed for. But then, a
revelation, a moment on the road to Damascus (or in
this case, perhaps it was D.C.), when Colvin
discovered a different way to integrate these two
risks:
I was on the road promoting it [the new research]
and then a bizarre thing happened. It was really
quick but all of a sudden I hit upon a message of
how to pitch it—and this this would not have
happened if I wasn’td o i n gi t —a n dt h i si sw h a tI
do take credit for. So I was struggling with Rick
[Smalley] hatingwhat we did—hestill hated what
we did. And a lot of my own community—I’ma
nanotechnologist right—so my own community
was, I was becoming kind of... I mean it was, it
was pointed, things I was not invited to, places I
had been before, you know. My thesis advisor
taking me aside and saying ‘do you realize what
you’re doing?’ You have to realize it’sa l w a y s
couched in the science and the quality of the
science and I kept saying ‘it’s an early area. How
can you be doing science yet? It’sj u s ts t a r t i n g . ’
But I hit upon a way to do it and that is the ‘safety
by design’ idea, the idea that you can study
implications and from that go back and engineer
materialsandprocessestobesaferandtohaveless
of the impact that you don’tw a n tt h e mt oh a v e . . .
Once I flipped it, labeled it ‘safety by design’ and
started to push it, I stopped using ‘wow to yuck?’
cause I got all kinds of crap for that. (VC #1)
‘SafetybyDesign’appealedimmediatelytochemists
and nanotechnologists, without giving up on the
fundamental message of risks to human and environ-
mental health. It was a very clever label for the research
CBEN saw as its core mission—both safety and
engineering. But as with any such label, it brought with
it a whole new set of challenges. Toxicologists,
according to Colvin objected: ‘It turned out, it pissed
off a lot of the toxicologists, because they were, like,
‘well how do you know it’ss a f e ? ’ It was a very good
question. Toxicologists raised a concern over conflict
of interest: if the goal is to engineer safe materials, then
of course the engineers qua toxicologists are going to
find that it’s safe. Colvin’s somewhat flip response to
this was that the same accusations might be leveled at
toxicologists: if they demonstrate toxicity, their funding
remains safe. But it nonetheless remains a good
question: what is the meaning of safety? How is it
defined and by whom? What would meaningful
agreement on safety look like? ‘Safety by design’
angered the toxicologists because it presumed that
13 This claim is related to recent work by Melinda Fagin which
makes a strong case for assessing justification by looking
beyond the papers into the social context generating them [9].
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established risk framework of hazard levels and
exposure routes; on the other hand chemists and
nanotechnologists were more comfortable with the
message:
It made my community feel better, because
[having the data] taught... them where the
chemistry is. They got to see the science. They
understood oh yeah, biological properties,
they’re interesting, they can be general [laughs].
They’re not just ‘did the rat die?’ We can talk
about what happened! ... I think the time I knew
I had fixed it [was when] NIH had a big
unveiling of their nano program and they invited
eight academics. Two were from Rice, one was
Rick Smalley and one was me; we only had
eight minutes, it was a big dog and pony show
and it was web cast everywhere and I really
pitched the safety by design idea and Rick loved
it. He just thought it was great and I got away
completely from ‘it’s bad, it’s going to kill us
all, I found a way to pitch it that, that he really
related to. (VC#1)
Colvin had successfully not only walked, but
actually dissolved the fine line. She saw her work as
re-positioning the various disciplines involved around
the materials they worked on and the kinds of
questions they asked. Rather than a classic, modernist
hierarchy of science with chemistry as fundamental
science and toxicology, biology and environmental
science as lower in the hierarchy (or outside it
altogether), this new configuration brought biology,
environmental science and toxicology into competition
with physics—as sciences that provide resources for
nanotechnologists to characterize the relationship of
structure and function of new materials. Perhaps even
more important, it was a message that Colvin could use
to make her own career—to become the person
identified with the engineering of new materials for
the purposes of safety. History may or may not reward
her with this recognition, but the goal and the success
were real enough as they happened.
CBEN began its life with a vision of ‘applications’
of nanotechnology to biology and environment—
medical diagnostics, cancer cures, environmental
remediation with membranes and so forth. With
‘safety by design’ Colvin managed to re-assert this
vision, but with safety as a new key component—a
new ‘function’ around which applications of new
materials can be characterized. To say, as they did in
their first paper, that buckyballs are toxic, but this can
be a good thing, was a key feature of this approach.
Toxicity and exposure routes are fundamental
properties—if we choose to exploit new materials
for whatever reason we need to know not only
properties like strength and conductivity, but safety
and exposure as well—they must be made theoretical,
they need a mode of veridiction.
However, ‘safety’ is not just one application among
others—it potentially affects every other field of
application as well. It moves the fields of biology,
toxicology and environmental science from being
resources in terms of a potential field of applications,
to resources in terms of a potential field of explanations,
constraints and systems for control and regulation.
Colvin’s bid to make her career in the same way as her
advisors and mentors (quantum dots and LEDs for
Alivasatos, carbon nanotubes and energy for Smalley)
might not be just one success alongside others, but one
that could potentially demand a reconfiguration of the
kind of science everyone in nanotechnology and
materials science pursues. It should come as no surprise
that the proposal is met with such intense emotion and
affect if it means that it directly affects the style, life and
work of a large segment of scientists—not just in nano,
but in toxicology and environmental science as well.
Similarly, the approach implies that, while toxicology is
essential to this reconfiguration, its theories of risk and
hazard are inadequate to the issues raised by
nanomaterials; it suddenly appears insufficient to seek
data about the risk and hazard of every new material
and every functionalization of every new material.
Rather, it creates a new mode of veridiction—a new set
of truth claims about safety as a fundamental property
of matter, claims that might be made about wide
classes of materials and their uses and ultimately
replace one version of risk analysis (‘is it safe?’)w i t h
another and quite different version (‘how do you
engineer towards safety?’)
The Wages of Safety
‘Safety by Design’ opened up a range of difficult
questions. Far from being a scientific ‘breakthrough’
or a simple scientific fact (things many studies in the
history and philosophy of science have demonstrated
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it decomposes and reveals. Colvin’s work on this idea
was born in controversy—both public controversy
over a threat to a new field and its funding as well as
more conventional scientific controversy over the
validity and legitimacy of her methods and findings.
As CBEN and ICON continued to pursue the question
of implications, and others in the emergent field of
nanotoxicology have continued their work, a series of
ramifications have followed. Many of these, it is
clear, have emerged because of the combination of the
new venue of ICON, which in its capacity as a kind of
membrane, channeled the ramifications both into the
lab and back out again and the attempt to make new
kinds of truth claims about safety as a fundamental
property of materials. Several of these ramifications
are worth noting briefly.
First, safety by design re-opened a question about
predictive toxicology—can it be done and how?
Toxicologists, especially those in the pharmaceutical
industry, have long been asking this question. CBEN
and ICON as institutions had no ties to the pharma-
ceutical industry, but as questions formed about how
to assess the potentially huge class of materials
emerging from nanotech labs, Colvin and others
turned to the field of ‘Quantitative Structure-Activity
Relationship’ modelling (QSAR). QSAR modelling
has had modest success in screening compounds for
toxic characteristics in the design of new pharmaceu-
tical compounds [17, 18, 22]. It is controversial
amongst some biologists however, because of its
overly simplistic model of metabolism. For many
biologists, and toxicologists like the Oberdoersters, it
is clear that molecules are transformed by the
environment and transform the environment in turn.
Livers, lungs and skin metabolize and change
molecules, and things like UV light and simple
motion can transform a material in the body or the
environment. Colvin counters that nanomaterials are
much smaller and simpler (and arguably better
understood) than complex bio-molecules, but the
question remains an open one.
Second, safety-by-design also raised questions
about differing definitions of nature that divide
biologists and nanotechnologists. Bensaude-Vincent
[1] has detailed the subtle differences between
versions of nanotechnology that either engineer
biomolecules or take inspiration from them for
design. Similarly, Colvin’s immediate community of
materials chemists and nanotechnologists have a far
more engineering-oriented approach to biology,which
means that systems biologists and others attempting
to understand biological entities in their ‘natural state’
find their approach of nanotechnolgy to be dirty and
uncontrolled. As Colvin puts it: ‘[systems biologists]
kind of feel like, if we don’t understand the natural
state why would we want a perturbation coming in,
right? What will that tell me? They’re interested in
using quantum dots as tags and fluorescers and all
that good stuff but I think to engage the biologists
we’re going to need another couple of years to come
up with some good mechanisms for interactions.
(VC#1)’ For many in nanotechnology (in a way
similar to the field of synthetic biology), nanomaterials
are probes for exploring what happens in different
contexts, under the assumption that it will tell us
something about structure and function.
Third, related to this is the issue of what standard
contexts will define the meaning of ‘biological’ or
‘environmental’ in this new domain of safety by design.
Ongoing experiments use fish, rats, human cells and
other proxies for the human body and its safety. These
choices have effects on the validity of claims made in
this new venue—are we all using the ‘same’ human
cells, and do we (nanotechnologists) know how to
handle them? A mode of veridiction in which Colvin
and others might claim to have engineered a ‘safe’
material also requires a mode of jurisdiction in which
standardized tools, standardized nomenclature and
standardized organisms allow these new claims to stick.
If it is only Colvin’s lab that tests buckyballs in human
HeLa cells, then the claims made thereby will have no
juridical force amongst other researchers—beyond
unverifiable, they will simply have no legitimacy to
other researchers. If CBEN and ICON are successful in
establishing new venues for this kind of research
however, it establishes the beginning of a jurisdiction
based in the standardization of media, tools and
organisms for a small and growing community.
Finally, safety by design has also raised a new
challenge to the definition of materials and their
environmental regulation. In part because of work
within ICON to identify ‘hot spots’ in the life cycle of
materials (a methodology introduced into discussions
at ICON by Mike Garner of Intel), research in this
area has focused on workplace manufacture and
handling of these materials. In subsequent work with
Georgia Tech colleague Joseph Hughes [11], the
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are connected more explicitly to the domains of
regulation and workplace/industrial handling of
nanomaterials. Specifically, the article demonstrates
how ‘in aqueous systems, nano-C60 behaves neither
as an individual molecule nor as a bulk solid (4315).
From this they draw conclusions that standard
measures of the prediction of toxicity (e.g. for
‘polyaromatic hydrocarbons’) are inadequate: ‘this
work clearly illustrates the limitations of the current
guidelines for the handling and disposal of C60, which
are based entirely on the properties of bulk carbon
black...these guidelines may need to be revisited.
(4315)’ Worker safety, as a ‘hot spot’ in the life cycle
of nanomaterials therefore enters explicitly into the
kinds of questions asked in nanotoxicology.
Conclusion
By mid 2008, the question of whether safety by
design would succeed as a new mode of verdiction
remained open. CBEN and ICON were actively
looking for ways to continue their work (CBEN’s
funding ends officially in 2011) and to take the idea
into new areas such as water treatment with magnetite
nanocrystals and an attempt to innovate a form of
‘open-source nanotechnology’ [27]. In reflecting on
its success, Colvin makes a strong case that even the
limited amount of research so far conducted has
changed the way chemists think about their materials:
What’s happening now is really an interesting
process of, of separation because now this issue
[toxicity and hazard] is being used by nano-
technologists to differentiate their materials
from somebody else’s. “Use gold because it’s
totally safe, don’t use quantum dots, they’re
going to kill you,” you know. So now what I get
from my own technical community is in large
part determined by what they make and what,
what particular thing they’re into. (VC#1)
The fact that nanotechnologists research and careers
are closely tied to expertise with a specific material
means that making ‘safety’ into a fundamental property
applies to everyone working with nanomaterials:
quantum dots, rods, buckyballs and nanotubes and so
on. Different ‘communities’ of researchers formed
around these different materials are handling such
information differently, and as Colvin and other research-
ers continue to conduct research on different materials.
This ongoing research includes an article on the toxicity
of functionalized Carbon nanotubes [38, 39], one on the
toxicity of nC60 [37] and two on the toxicology of
titanium dioxide [38, 41], each of which has drawn
more and more nano-scientists into the debate.
Now we’re in the secondary backlash [that] is
more pointed, poignant, in that now that the data
is emerging there are particular materials and
particular issues about certain classes of materials
which are very significant or potentially signifi-
cant and those communities are then pushing
back... So quantum dots for example: you can’t
get a Q-dot bio-imaging proposal through NIH
right now because ofthe toxicityof quantum dots;
and that community is handling it well. That
community is owning up to it saying, ‘Well, duh!
we’ve got cadmium in there you know, we’re not
idiots. We’ve got to figure out a way to deal with
this and we’re going to make alternative quantum
dots and we’re going to learn how to wrap em up
real tight and...’ So I think that community is
rolling with it. The carbon nanotube and carbon
nanostructure communityonthe other handisnot.
They are much more reactive...(VC#2)
The differentiation of researchers based on the
toxicityof their materials isnew (to the chemists);never
before has it been their task to manage and understand
this aspect of their materials at the stage of characteriz-
ing them for a particular function. By the same token,
very little information exists to date, so the anecdotal
claimthattheNIHisresistingproposalsforquantumdot
bio-imaging might suggest that it has taken a more
precautionary stance than ever before; a stance in which
it expects researchers to find ways to ‘wrap ‘em up real
tight’ in a manner that is convincing to their peers and
not only to the ‘downstream’ regulators such as the
FDA, EPA or toxicology communities. This shift in the
configuration of power, in which nano-scientists are
nowpayingmoreattentiontosuchissuesisbynomeans
simply about the success of ‘responsibility’ or ‘ethics’
but also has to do with the active work of creating a
novel field in which new things can be produced—new
‘structure-function’ relationships that are both useful in
terms of safety (mode of concern) and useful in more
conventional terms of understanding how to control
matter (mode of control).
94 Nanoethics (2009) 3:79–96Thus, the evidence that buckyballs might be toxic,
but this might be a good thing. Understanding such a
claim means getting over the language of applica-
tions and implications, on both sides of that debate.
Simplistic assertions of good and evil (buckyballs
are toxic, watch out!), or absolute statements about
precaution and danger, or risk and responsibility do
not capture either the development of the science or
the response and reformulation of ethics at work.
Getting over implications and applications (going
beyond good and evil), however, does not mean
going beyond good and bad, but attending to the
rank ordering of values taking place in the changing
configuration of nanoscale science and engineering.
There is an ongoing struggle within science to
redefine how values will be incorporated into
scientific research—and this is also something that
drives the research itself. The different modes of
veridiction represented by toxicology and materials
chemistry are synthesized into a new one by the
invention of safety by design. Furthermore, such a
mode is not just a result of one scientists’ new
claims, but requires the invention of new venues
within which one can conduct such research, the
definition of new modes of jurisdiction that can
adjudicate (across materials chemistry and nano-
toxicology) standards by which truth claims are
judged and ultimately the creation of new objects,
like functionalized buckyballs, which literalize these
new configurations of knowledge around a usable,
and very real, object.
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